In this paper, we seek to find the optimal retentions for an insurance company which intends to reinsure each ofn risks belonging to its portfolio, by means of a pure quota-share treaty, a pure excess of loss treaty or any combination of the two. The criterion chosen to the selection of the optimal programme is the maximization of the adjustment coefficient, attending to the relationship existing between thls coeffioent and Lundberg's upper bound of the ruin probability.
l. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that an insurance company seeks reinsurance for n independent risks (by a risk we mean a single pohcy or a group of policies--so we could speak of n independent hnes of insurance), and has a choice between a pure quota-share treaty, an excess of loss treaty or any combination of the two, for any of the risks. The way this combination operates is as follows: first the quota share contract will apply, so that the insurer shall remain responsible for no more than its share--established by the contract--of any claim that may occur for that nsk; afterwards, the excess of loss contract applys, so that, by no means, shall the insurer (of course considering only that part for which it remains reponsible after the quota-share contract) pay more than a certain fixed amount of any claim that takes place.
The problem consists of determining the optimal retention limits for each risk, in each of the two forms of reinsurance. "Optimal" in the sense those limits maximize the adjustment coefficient and, therefore, minimize the upper bound to the ruin probabihty, supplied by Lundberg's inequality This same criterion was also adopted by WATERS (1979) and CENTENO (1986) and, in a certain way, this work may be considered as a generalization of their results Although this criterion does not by any means have to minimize the (analytically uncalculable) rum probability, it is a good criterion if one wishes to give analytical results.
Surplus and stop loss treaties are not considered in th~s paper WATERS (1983), derives sufficient conditions for the adjustment coefficient to be uni-model, for stop loss reinsurance. ASTIN BULLETIN, Vol 21, No 1 For each ~= 1, 2 .... , n, let a,, be the decision variable representing the quota-share retention on risk i; Me, the decision variable representing the N, of loss retention limit on risk i; Y, = _~~ X,j, with X,0-= 0, the excess j=0 insurer's aggregate gross (of reinsurance) clatms on risk l, m some fixed time interval, where N, is the number of claims and {X,j}j= i. , N, are the in&vidual claims; P, the insurer's gross (of expenses and reinsurance) premmm income with respect to risk i and e, P, the amount used to cover the insurer's expenses with respect to the same nsk.
After a combination of a quota-share with an excess of loss treaty the insurer N, will retain, from risk t, Y,(a,, Me) = ~ min {a, Xv, M, }, (i = 1 .... , n) .
j=l
The choice of uniform aj = ... = an and Mi = ... = Mn, which is generally made in practice, has been dealt with in CZNTENO (1986) . In this paper, therefore, retention limits which can, for instance, be set differently for portfolios of different classes of business are also dealt with Let Pt,(a,, Me) be the total reinsurance premium paid by the insurer, in respect to risk i 0t is, naturally, the summation of the quota-share and excess of loss reinsuance premmms).
The problem which is to be solved is, then, Maximize R (a, _M_) sub. to:
where R(a, M), is the adjustment coefficient, defined, as it is known, as the unique positive root of Note that R(a, _M_) is the adjustment coefficient (see BEARD, PENTIKAINEN and PESONEN (1984) , p. 363) after taking account of the reinsurance arrangement.
ASSUMPTIONS AND PREMIMINARIES
At: Y,(t = 1, 2 ..... n) are independent random variables; Pt, (a,, M,) 
Assumption As is somewhat restrlcnve, but without it the insurer could reinsure the whole risk through a quota-share arrangement with a certain profit. The same applies to At0, but with respect to the excess of loss reinsurance treaty A 9 lmphes that the loading on the quota-share reinsurance premium is positive At last, All assures the existence of a margin, necessary to cover eventual deviations from the expected losses, and also to pay the reinsurance costs.
Under assumptions A~, A2 and A3, R(a, __M_) is the only pos~nve root of
(See BEARD, PE~TIKAINEN and PESONEN (L984), p. 363, for the equivalence of (4) and (1).) Let E[W(a,_M_) ] denote the insurer's expected net profit, after reinsurance and expenses, i.e., 
(5) E[W(a,_M_> = ,=,~ I(c,-e,)P,+a, [(I-c,)P,-a, EtX,]]-
is non-negative, we can say that for fixed a, the expected net profit will be mammum when M, = + oo (l = 1, 2,..., n) . Hence it is possible to specify F as being (6) F= {a: ,=~ [(c,-e,)P,+a,[(I-c,) 
Let us denote --G(R; a_,__M_.) by D(R, a_,M_) so that OR The first aspect to be considered, is that R = 0 is a trivial solution of equation (3); Secondly, we have that
it Is non-negative, V (a,M), which means that G(R;a,M) is a convex function of R,
by assumptions A s and A 9.
Hence, as G(R; a, _M_) equals zero when R is null, G(R; a, _MM_) Is a convex function of R, and G(R;a,_M_.) tends to infinity when R tends to Q, then, ~t will only exist such an R = R(a,_M_) > 0 which turns G(R,a, M) to be null again, if and only if,
To finish the prof, we only have to notice that
(li) Immediate, given the proof of (1).
The following lemma will be useful to the solution to our problem.
Lemma 2 : For any a e F there exxsts a umque (a, ._M_) e T, let it be (a, _~._), such that -In (1 +~,) t = 1,2,..,n.
Proof: Let us consider the set of points _M_ such that
and let us define then G (R ; a) has a unique positive root for each a ~ F. Let us denote it/~ (a.). It can be proved, using the Implicit Function Theorem (see for example COURANT and JOHN (1974) , pp. 221-223), Part (2) of Lemma 1 and A4, that R (_a, _MM_.), for (a, _M_) ~ T, and /~ (a), for a ~ F, are twice dlfferenUable.
THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
The following result provides the solution to our problem. 
ReRM'(1 -F,(M,/a,)) = n(l +~,) (1 -F,(M,/a,)).
So, using Lemma 2 we can say that for a fixed value of a e F, with a, 4: 0, Vt = 1, 2 .... n, the only turmng point of R (a,__M_) is such that (10) M,= R-lln(l+a,), t= 1,2 .... n.
Differentiating (9) twice with respect to M, (using again the Implicit Function
Theorem and (10)) we get
with D(R; a, __M_) given by (7). We can see that each side of equation (11) IS negative since D(R; .a., _M_) is positive by Lemma 1 (li).
On the other hand,
~M, oMsR(q_,_M_)
=0, j -/= ,.
M,= R -~ ln(I +=,)
Mi=R-' In{1 +~j)
Hence we can conclude that for a fixed value a e F with a, ~ 0, Vi = 1, 2 .... , n, R(a_, _M._) is a unlmodal function of _M_.
If a_e F and ak = 0 for some k = 1, 2,.., n, then of course any value for the excess of loss retention limit of risk k, including Mk = R -I In (1 +Uk), will provide the same value for the adjustment coefficient.
Then This implies that there exists at most a point ~F such that (14) holds for i= 1, 2, ...,n.
Noticing that
hm ---R(_q.) = [(I-c,)P,-2, E[X,]] hm
o,~0÷ 0a, ~,~0+ /5 (k, a)
with a ~ F, is positive by A 9 and Lemma 1 (n), the proof is finished. O
To summarize, we can now conclude that the optimum programme of reinsurance, when a company IS to reinsure n independent risks by a combinanon of the quota share an excess of loss forms of reinsurance, is the point (a, M) which fulfils the following set of conditions: >_2,
Note that we can regard the quota-share reinsurance premium for risk t (see A6) as being calculated using the expected value principle with loading factor ~,, where
Then, Corollary I imphes that if &, > ~,, Le if quota-share is, in the obvious sence more expensive than excess of loss reinsurance, then excess of loss reinsurance is optimal. Excess of loss reinsurance was already proved to be the optimal form of reinsurance (see GERBER 1979), p 129), m the sence that it maximizes the adjustment coefl'iclent, under the assumption that the loading coeffioent is the same for the insurer and the reinsurer (which ~s not the case in our paper).
When the number of risks, n, ~s greater than one, the solution found for the problem, may not be the solutton that we would obtain if the risks were considered separately In other words, if we regard as optimal a set of retention limits that maximizes the adjustment coeffioent, then what is optimal when each risk is considered individually may not be optimal when the risks are considered together, as we will see next
In the result that follows, R(a,, M,) (i = I, 2 .... n) is, for fixed (a,, M,), the adjustment coefficient associated to risk t, when this ~s considered on its own, defined as the unique positive root of G,(R,; a,, M,) = O, (15) where (16) G, (R,; a,, M,) = 2, e R'°'" dF,(x)+en'M'[l -F,(M,/a,) 
I G,(R,;a,,M,) < 0 if 0 < R, < R,(a,,M~) t G, (R,; a,, M,) > 0 If R, > R,(a,, M,)
for t = 1,2,...,n. From (19) and attending to (17) and (18) Rk(ak, Mk) = Rl(at, Mr) .
Then the result follows immediately, since R(_a.,_M_) for (.a.,_M_) e T is the unique positive root of which is an exponenclal. Let )-1 = 2, 22 = 10, Pi = 27, P2 = 23.5, el = e2 = .35, Ul = 30 and U2 = 15 The expected profit, before any reinsurance arrangement takes place, is 3.491(6) (1.55 from risk I and 1.941(6) from risk 2), R is .02849 and, therefore, the upper bound given by Lundberg's inequality for the rum probability, is 0.2774. Considering the two risks separately the adjustment coefficients are R~ = 0 01487 and R2 = 0 1864, giving then upper bounds for the ruin probablhtles of 0.6401 and 0.0610, for risks 1 and 2 respectively.
The optimal reinsurance programme was calculated assuming different values for ~ and setting ~2 = .3, c~ = c2 = .25. The results can be seen on Table 1 . Analysing Table 1 , the mare aspect that seems evident is that, as long as ~ increases, a similar evolution is presented by ratio M~/al, that is to say, the excess of loss form of reinsurance becomes less and less attracnve. Table 2 gives the same kind of information as Table 1 , when treating the two risks separately. Note that Ri < R < R2. One way of explaining this occurrence may be the following when the reinsurance problem is solved taking the risks together, there is a sort of a transfer of part of the income produced for the "less dangerous" (and, therefore "less needed" of reinsurance) risks, to substd~ze the payment of the reinsurance of those potentially more risky. In th~s example such interaction implied a decrease in the joint expected net profit, but there are substantial benefits in the company's security, as a whole. Nothing of this can be achieved, if one ms~sts on treating each risk separately
